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ABSTRACT
Many popular songwriters, recording artists, and bands—including Katy Perry, Juicy
J, Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke, and Led Zeppelin—find themselves involved in
disputes over the copyrights in their musical compositions and sound recordings.
Arguments arise over melody, lyrics, harmony, pitch, rhythm, tempo, tone, phrasing,
and other musical elements in music copyright infringement matters. But which
elements are actually protected under copyright law and which are so commonly used
in the general creation of music that they are unprotectible? This is the difficult ideaexpression dichotomy question that numerous courts are tasked with answering. This
case note explores the idea-expression dichotomy in the context of music copyright
infringement by taking a close look at the decision of the Central District of California
in Gray v. Perry and the influential and related decisions of the Ninth Circuit in
Williams v. Gaye and Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin. This case note examines how the
courts decided which musical elements are protected under music copyright law and
references decisions from different circuits that have wrestled with the same question:
which musical elements are original expression and subject to copyright protection and
which are tantamount to ideas that cannot be protected.
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IS GRAY V. PERRY THE ONE THAT GOT AWAY? THE IDEA-EXPRESSION
DICHOTOMY AND MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
MARISA C. SCHUTZ*

I. INTRODUCTION
Whether it be listening to the radio in the car, singing along to Spotify in the
shower, or attending a live concert of your favorite band, everyone can undoubtedly
say that they have listened to music in “One Way Or Another.”1 But have you ever
considered how copyright law applies to your favorite recording artists such as Taylor
Swift, Ed Sheeran, or Katy Perry?2 Katy Perry and Juicy J definitely have.3
On September 11, 2019, the United States District Court for the Central District
of California entered a judgment for $2.8 million, holding that Katy Perry and Juicy J
were liable for copyright infringement.4 The copyright infringement lawsuit was
brought by Christian rapper Marcus Gray, otherwise known as Flame.5 Gray’s song
“Joyful Noise” received notable recognition when it was nominated for a Grammy
Award in 2008, and it peaked at number nine on the Billboard charts.6 In the copyright
infringement lawsuit he filed against Katy Perry and Juicy J, Gray claimed that their
song “Dark Horse” infringed on “Joyful Noise.”7 Katy Perry and Juicy J are both highly
successful recording artists in the music industry. Their song “Dark Horse” was
nominated for a Grammy Award in 2014, and it reached the number one spot on the
Billboard charts.8
*
2021 Marisa C. Schutz. Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2022, at UIC John Marshall Law School;
B.A. in Political Science and Music, Alvernia University, (2019).
1 See BLONDIE, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER (Capitol Records 1978).
2 See Hall v. Swift, No. CV 17-6882-MWF (ASx), 2020 WL 5358390, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020)
(claiming that Taylor Swift’s song “Shake it Off” infringed on plaintiffs’ song “Playas Gon’ Play.”); see
also Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (alleging that Ed Sheeran’s song
“Thinking Out Loud” infringed on plaintiffs’ song “Let’s Get it On.”).
3 See generally Gray v. Perry, 2:15-CV-05642-CAS-JCx, 2020 WL 1275221, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
16, 2020) (arguing that Katy Perry and Juicy J’s song “Dark Horse” infringed on plaintiffs’ song “Joyful
Noise.”).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See FLAME, JOYFUL NOISE (2008); See also RECORDING ACADEMY GRAMMY AWARDS,
https://www.grammy.com/grammys/artists/flame/9045 (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) (showing the
Grammy
Award
nomination
Flame
received
for
“Joyful
Noise”);
BILLBOARD,
https://www.billboard.com/music/lecrae/chart-history/gospel-digital-song-sales/song/680141
(last
visited Sept. 26, 2020) (showing the peak position of the song “Joyful Noise” on the Billboard charts).
7 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *1.
8 See KATY PERRY AND JUICY J., DARK HORSE (Capitol Records 2014); see also RECORDING
ACADEMY GRAMMY AWARDS, https://www.grammy.com/grammys/artists/katy-perry/5726 (last visited
on Sept. 26, 2020) (showing the Grammy Award that the song “Dark Horse” was nominated for);
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Although the jury returned its verdict in favor of Gray, on March 16, 2020, District
Judge Christina A. Snyder vacated the jury’s verdicts and granted judgment for Perry
and Juicy J as a matter of law.9 This was done because Gray failed to show that the
musical elements at issue in “Joyful Noise” were original expressions, either
independently or combined.10 Therefore, the musical elements at issue, namely an
eight-note ostinato, were not entitled to copyright protection and were incapable of
being infringed.11
This case note considers how the idea-expression dichotomy applies to popular
music.12 Part II of this case note will take an in-depth look at the case, Gray v. Perry.
In Part III, this case note will discuss current copyright law and the idea-expression
dichotomy in relation to copyright infringement. Part IV will analyze the court’s
position on the idea-expression dichotomy as it relates to commonplace musical
elements.
In Part V, this case note will conclude that the court was correct when it held that
the “Dark Horse” ostinato did not infringe upon the “Joyful Noise” ostinato.13 An
ostinato is a “short musical phrase or rhythmic pattern” that is used as a reoccurring
theme throughout a musical composition.14 Ostinatos are commonly used in musical
compositions as one of the essential building blocks used to create a song.15 This case
note argues that to extend copyright protection to eight notes used recurringly in a
musical composition would be akin to granting copyright protection to an idea rather
than the original expression of the idea. Furthermore, this case note will suggest that
future court decisions involving music copyright infringement should adhere to the
precedent set by Gray v. Perry and the decision that shortly preceded it, Skidmore v.
Led Zeppelin.16
II. BACKGROUND
This section will discuss the relevant background material necessary to
understand music copyright infringement, specifically in the Ninth Circuit. First,
Subsection A will discuss the general principles of United States copyright law that
BILLBOARD, https://www.billboard.com/music/katy-perry/chart-history/HSI/song/797284 (last visited
on Sept. 26, 2020) (showing the number one position the song “Dark Horse” reached on the Billboard
charts).
9 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18.
10 See generally id. at *11 (noting that it was Katy Perry’s star power and Capitol Records’
marketing efforts, not the use of similar musical elements to Plaintiffs’ song “Joyful Noise,” that
generated the commercial success of the song “Dark Horse.”).
11 Id. at *17.
12 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (codifying the idea-expression dichotomy which
states that copyright protection extends only to the original expression of ideas and not to ideas
themselves).
13 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *1 (explaining that the portions of each song at issue, “Dark Horse”
and “Joyful Noise,” were both musical devices known as ostinatos).
14 Id. at *18 (“[The Encyclopedia Britannica defines] [a]n ostinato [as] a short musical phrase or
rhythmic pattern repeated in a musical composition.”).
15 Id.
16 Id.; see generally Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1079 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that
the opening sequence of the band Led Zeppelin’s song “Stairway to Heaven” does not infringe on the
band Spirit’s song “Taurus.”).
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one must understand before taking a closer look at music copyright law. After the
foundation for general copyright law is laid, Subsection B will explore copyright law
specifically as it relates to music. Next, Subsection C will briefly define the ideaexpression dichotomy and explain how it applies to common musical elements. Finally,
Subsection D will present the elements of a copyright infringement claim and the
relevant tests used in the Ninth Circuit to analyze whether infringement exists.
A. General Copyright Principles
The foundation for United States copyright law is found in the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution: “The Congress shall have power to . . . promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors . . . the
exclusive right to their . . . writings . . . .”17 The Copyright Act of 1976 and its
amendments elaborate on the different aspects of United States copyright law.18 The
underlying purpose of copyright law is to incentivize the creation of new creative works
while also encouraging the free exchange of ideas.19
The general rule is that copyright protection extends to “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” including musical
compositions and sound recordings.20 Although the original expression of ideas is
copyrightable, ideas themselves are not eligible for copyright protection.21 The
copyright owner is typically the author or authors of the work.22 The copyright owner
enjoys six exclusive rights: (1) the reproduction right; (2) the derivative right; (3) the
distribution right; (4) the public performance right; (5) the public display right; and (6)
the digital public performance right.23 These exclusive rights endure for the lifetime of
the author plus seventy years after the author’s death, upon which copyright protection
ends, and the work enters into the public domain.24
If any one of the exclusive rights is infringed, the copyright owner may bring a
copyright infringement suit against the infringer.25 However, a prerequisite to filing a
copyright infringement suit is copyright registration with the United States Copyright
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (2021) (providing the current Copyright Act applicable to
copyright registration, ownership, and infringement).
19 Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).
20 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2021) (recognizing the different categories of creative works that are eligible
for copyright protection).
21 Id. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 341 (reinforcing the fundamental principle of copyright law that
facts and ideas cannot be copyrighted).
22 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2021).
23 See id. § 106; see generally DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC
BUSINESS, 212–13 (10th ed. 2019) (describing what the different exclusive rights entail in the context
of musical works); see also Diamond v. Gillis, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (detailing
the exclusive rights a copyright owner enjoys specifically related to musical compositions).
24 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2021); see also PASSMAN, supra note 23, at 310–11 (explaining that copyrighted
works created after January 1, 1978, are protected for the life of the author plus seventy years and
after expiring, go into the public domain; once in the public domain, the public may freely use the
work without charge).
25 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2021).
17
18
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Office.26 At its core, a claim for copyright infringement requires a showing of ownership
of a valid copyright and copying of protected elements within the copyrighted work.27
B. Music Copyright Fundamentals
A song contains two separate copyrights: one for the musical composition and one
for the sound recording.28 A musical composition is comprised of the lyrics and melody
of a song.29 Contrastingly, a sound recording is the master audio recording of a song.30
The copyright in a musical composition is infringed when an individual, without
authorization from the copyright owner, reproduces the musical composition, creates
a derivative work based on the musical composition, distributes the musical
composition to the public, publicly performs the musical composition, or publicly
displays the musical composition without permission.31
On the other hand, the copyright in a sound recording is more limited and is only
infringed when an individual, without authorization from the copyright owner,
reproduces the sound recording, creates a derivative work based on the sound
recording, distributes copies of the sound recording, or publicly performs the sound
recording through a digital transmission.32

26 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2021); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 1: COPYRIGHT BASICS 5 (Dec.
2019), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf (explaining that copyright registration is not
required but confers several significant benefits including the ability to bring civil infringement suits,
the establishment of a public record of a copyright claim, prima facie evidence of a valid copyright,
and the eligibility for statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs); but see Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit
Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019) (holding that registration is not complete
until “the Register has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.”).
27 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018) (outlining the basic elements of a
copyright infringement claim, specifically in the Ninth Circuit).
28 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248–49 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Sound recordings and
their underlying musical compositions are separate works with their own distinct copyrights.”).
29 Id. at 1249; see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.05
(2020) (“A musical composition consists of rhythm, harmony, and melody, and it is from these elements
that originality is to be determined.”).
30 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2021) (defining sound recordings as “works that result from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . regardless of the nature of the material
objects . . . in which they are embodied.”); see also BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627 (E.D.
La. 1999) (comparing sound recordings and musical compositions: “The sound recording is the
aggregation of sounds captured in the recording, while the song or tangible medium of expression
embodied in the recording is the musical composition.”).
31 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2021); see also PASSMAN, supra note 23, at 213 (applying a copyright owner’s
exclusive rights specifically to musical compositions). Examples of public performances of a musical
composition include playing a song at a concert venue, on the radio, or through a streaming service.
Examples of a derivative work of a musical composition include a song that parodies the original, a
sample, or a remix. The only example provided for the public display of a musical composition is the
display of lyrics.
32 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2021).
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C. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The idea-expression dichotomy is codified in the Copyright Act of 1976 and states
that the original expression of ideas is eligible for copyright protection, but ideas and
facts are not protectible themselves.33 In the context of musical works, musical devices
such as notes, chords, scales, and key signatures are essential building blocks for the
creation of music, and therefore, are not copyrightable subject matter by themselves.34
D. Music Copyright Infringement
The two general elements of a music copyright infringement claim are proof of
ownership of a valid copyright, in either a musical composition or sound recording, and
proof of unauthorized copying of original elements from the musical work.35 Ownership
of a valid copyright is rarely contested because a certificate of copyright registration
provides prima facie evidence of a valid copyright.36 However, the second element,
unauthorized copying of original elements of the copyrighted work, has been litigated
extensively.37
There are two ways that unauthorized copying of a musical work can be
established: (1) through direct evidence of copying; or (2) through a showing that the
alleged infringer had access to the musical work and that there is substantial
similarity between the original song and the infringing song.38 Direct evidence of
access to a musical work is rare, so access is typically shown through circumstantial
evidence such as widespread dissemination of the original song.39 The key to
establishing access is determining whether an alleged infringer had a “reasonable

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2021).
Id.; see generally Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068–69 (2d Cir. 1988) (only a “limited
number of notes and chords [are] available to composers” and as a result “common themes frequently
reappear in various compositions . . . . Thus, [substantial] similarity between pieces of popular music
must extend beyond . . . themes that are so trite as to be likely to reappear in many compositions.”);
see also Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that musical elements such
as key signature, tempo, chord structure and harmonic progression, and guitar rhythm are common,
unprotectable musical elements that are not subject to copyright protection as a matter of law).
35 Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
36 See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. BPI Commc’ns, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194 (C.D.
Cal. 2005); Sony Music Entm’t v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d 217, 224 (E.D. Va. 2019); King
Records, Inc. v. Bennett, 438 F. Supp. 2d 812, 837 (M.D. Tenn. 2006).
37 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994);
Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v. Evolution of Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2015);
Williams, 895 F.3d at 1120; Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d at 1064.
38 See generally L.A. Printex Indus. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 675 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2012)
(providing the general test to prove copying and establish copyright infringement); see also Selle v.
Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1984) (specifying the test for copying in regard to a musical
composition).
39 See Selle, 741 F.2d at 901 (“[D]irect evidence of copying is rarely available, [so] the plaintiff can
rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove [copying], and the most important [type] of this sort of
circumstantial evidence is proof of access.”); see also Loomis v. Cornish, 836 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir.
2016) (“Where there is no evidence of access, circumstantial evidence can be used to prove access
either by (1) establishing a chain of events linking the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s access, or
(2) showing that the plaintiff’s work has been widely disseminated.”).
33
34
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opportunity” to hear an artist and copyright owner’s original song.40 Courts have
inferred access where a song is readily available on multiple mediums such as
terrestrial radio or streaming services.41
Once access is shown, there is no copyright infringement unless substantial
similarity between the two songs is also established.42 Similar to the test to prove
copying, the Ninth Circuit uses a two-prong test to show substantial similarity
between the original song and the infringing song: (1) the objective extrinsic test; and
(2) the subjective intrinsic test.43 The objective extrinsic test requires the court to
identify the protected elements of the copyright owner’s song and determine whether
the protected musical elements are objectively similar to corresponding elements in
the alleged infringing song.44 The extrinsic test helps courts discern whether the
alleged copying of a song was illicit or permitted.45
Although individual elements of a song may be ineligible for copyright protection
on their own, they may be eligible for copyright protection when they are combined.46
However, it is nearly impossible to extend copyright protection to a combination of
individually unprotected musical elements that have a “narrow range of available
creative choices,” such as common musical devices, including scales and chord
progressions, unless the new combination is nearly identical to the original song.47
The extrinsic test can be satisfied in one of two ways: (1) either the musical
elements at issue are individually protectable; or (2) the musical elements are
protectable when combined.48 To receive copyright protection, the individual elements
of a song must be original and expressed in tangible form.49 Similar musical devices
are used in most popular music, and therefore, “many of the elements that appear in
popular music are not individually protectable.”50 All new music necessarily relies on
See 4 NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.02[A].
See Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1068 (“Given the ubiquity of ways to access media online, from
YouTube to subscription services like Netflix and Spotify, access may be established by a trivial
showing that the work is available on demand.”).
42 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1168.
43 See Perry, 2020 WL 1275221 at *3; see also Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477,
485 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Proof of the substantial similarity is satisfied by a two-part test of extrinsic
similarity and intrinsic similarity.”).
44 See Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1064 (“The extrinsic test compares the objective similarities of
specific expressive elements in the two [songs]. Crucially, because only substantial similarity in
protectable expression may constitute actionable copying that results in infringement liability, it is
essential to distinguish between the protected and unprotected material . . . .”); Malibu Textiles, Inc.
v. Label Lane Int’l, 922 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2019); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir.
2004); Morill v. Stefani, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
45 See Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[C]opyright law does not
forbid all copying, only the illicit copying of protected works.”).
46 See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] combination of unprotectable
elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous enough and their
selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original work of
authorship.”).
47 See Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1079 (holding that there is a narrow range of creative choices
available for musical compositions using specific major or minor scales because there are a limited
number of chord progressions that can accompany lyrics and still sound appealing).
48 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *4, *8.
49 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2021); see Carey, 376 F.3d at 851.
50 See Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *4; see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 29, § 2.05 (“In the field of
popular songs, many, if not most compositions bear some similarity to prior songs.”).
40
41
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the essential musical devices and common building blocks utilized in other music.51
“These building blocks belong in the public domain and cannot be exclusively
appropriated by any particular author.”52
When musical elements are not protected individually, they may still qualify for
copyright protection as a combination. A combination of musical elements is protected
when the particular selection and arrangement of the music is an original expression.53
However, “[i]t is most unusual for infringement to be found on the basis of similarity
of a single line, and generally, the likelihood of copying but a single line of such
importance . . . is remote.”54 If the extrinsic test cannot be satisfied on either ground,
there is no copyright infringement because the musical elements at issue are not
copyrightable expression.55
If the objective extrinsic test is satisfied, the subjective intrinsic test is applied.56
The subjective intrinsic test asks whether an ordinary observer would think that the
two works were substantially similar or “whether the ordinary reasonable person
would find the total concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar.”57 The
subjective intrinsic test is generally left to the jury to decide, and because of this, courts
are hesitant to disturb the jury’s findings with regard to the intrinsic test.58 Both the
objective extrinsic test and the subjective intrinsic test must be satisfied to conclude
that two works are substantially similar.59
III. THE CASE

A. Facts
Christian rappers Marcus Gray, Emmanuel Lambert, and Chike Ojukwu, filed a
copyright infringement lawsuit against popstar Katy Perry, rapper Juicy J, and the
other parties involved in the chain of distribution of the song “Dark Horse.”60 The
complaint alleged that Defendants’ song “Dark Horse” infringed on Plaintiffs’ song
“Joyful Noise.”61 A similar eight-note ostinato incorporated into both songs was at the

51 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (“Music . . . borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much
which was well known and used before.”).
52 Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1069.
53 See id. at 1059; see also Williams, 895 F.3d at 1117 (finding that a combination of musical
elements may receive copyright protection if it is sufficiently original).
54 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2][a].
55 Stefani, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1058.
56 Malibu Textiles, 922 F.3d at 952–53.
57 Pasillas v. McDonalds Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991).
58 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *13.
59 Id. at *3.
60 Id. at *1 (naming the other defendants in the case as Dr. Luke, Sarah Hudson, Max Martin,
Cirkut, Kasz Money Inc., Capitol Records LLC, Kitty Purry Inc., UMG Recordings Inc., Universal
Music Group Inc., WB Music Corp., BMG Rights Management LLC, and Kobalt Music Publishing
America, Inc.).
61 Id. at *1.
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heart of the allegations.62 Plaintiffs complained that the utilization of an eight-note
ostinato in “Dark Horse” infringed on the musical composition copyright of a similar
eight-note ostinato in “Joyful Noise.”63 Plaintiffs claimed that the individual ostinato
in “Joyful Noise” was protected original expression and that Defendants had access to
it when they composed the ostinato for “Dark Horse.”64
B. Procedural History and Issues
Between July 17, 2019, and August 1, 2019, a jury trial was held to decide whether
the “Dark Horse” ostinato infringed the “Joyful Noise” ostinato.65 After the trial, the
jury found Katy Perry and Juicy J liable for copyright infringement and awarded
Marcus Gray and the other plaintiffs $2.8 million in damages.66 On September 11,
2019, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs.67 Defendants followed with a string
of procedural moves, attempting to persuade the court to grant judgment as a matter
of law or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issues.68
Ultimately, a bench trial was held to determine whether judgment as a matter of
law in favor of Katy Perry and Juicy J was appropriate, whether a new trial was
appropriate, and whether prejudgment interest should be granted to Marcus Gray and
the other plaintiffs.69 The main issue concerning music copyright infringement turned
on whether the individual elements of Plaintiffs’ song “Joyful Noise” were
independently protectable original expression, and if not, whether unprotected
elements of a song are protected when they are combined.70
C. The Holding of the Court
The court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, vacating
the jury’s verdicts that held Defendants liable for infringement and granted Plaintiffs
$2.8 million in damages.71 The court held that the “Dark Horse” ostinato did not
infringe on the “Joyful Noise” ostinato because none of the individual elements at issue
in the “Joyful Noise” ostinato were independently entitled to copyright protection.72
Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18.
Id. at *1.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *1.
68 Id. (detailing the various procedural mechanisms used by Defendants and Plaintiffs, including
Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial and Plaintiffs’ opposition and
motion for prejudgment interest).
69 Id. at *2 (explaining when judgment as a matter of law is appropriate).
70 Id. at *3 (“The sole issue at trial concerned . . . whether defendants’ “Ostinato 2” in “Dark
Horse” infringed upon plaintiffs’ ostinato in “Joyful Noise” by copying constituent elements of
plaintiffs’ ostinato that are original.”).
71 Id. at *18.
72 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *7 (“The Court cannot conclude, pursuant to the extrinsic test, that
any of the allegedly original individual elements of the “Joyful Noise” ostinato are independently
protectable as a matter of law.”).
62
63
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Likewise, the court also held that the individual elements of the “Joyful Noise” ostinato
were unprotectable as a combination.73
The court based its decision, in part, on Plaintiffs’ own expert witness testimony,
which highlighted five characteristics of the “Joyful Noise” ostinato that demonstrated
that the individual elements of the ostinato were not original.74 First, the phrase length
of the “Joyful Noise” ostinato is eight beats, a typical length for ostinatos.75 Second, the
pitch sequence used in the ostinato is a commonly used musical pattern that generally
serves to build up to a climax in songs.76 Third, the note resolution used in the ostinato
is commonplace in the majority of popular music and more necessary than original.77
Fourth, the rhythm of the ostinato is simple.78 Finally, the “pingy synthesized” timbre
of the ostinato is common in popular music.79
Plaintiffs presented nine elements intended to prove the originality of the “Joyful
Noise” ostinato: (1) the minor scale key and melody; (2) the phrase length; (3) the pitch
sequence; (4) the resolution; (5) the eight-note rhythm; (6) the syncopated, even
rhythm; (7) the general use of the ostinato as a musical device; (8) the timbre; and (9)
the texture.80 However, the court discredited each of these elements and held that none
of them were individually entitled to copyright protection.81
First, the key or scale of a song is ineligible for copyright protection.82 Second, the
length of a phrase is not an “independently protectable musical element.”83 Third, pitch
sequence is “not entitled to copyright protection.”84 Fourth, resolution is ineligible for
individual copyright protection because it is commonplace in popular music.85 Fifth, a
rhythm consisting of eight notes is also common and not afforded individual copyright
protection.86 Sixth, an evenly-spaced rhythm, standing alone, does not warrant
copyright protection.87 Seventh, an ostinato is another common musical element that,

73 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *10 (“[T]he musical elements that comprise the 8-note ostinato in
‘Joyful Noise’ are [not] numerous enough and [not] arranged in a sufficiently original manner to
warrant copyright protection.”).
74 Id. at *6 (showing that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato was not comprised of original elements
entitled to copyright protection).
75 Id. (“It is characteristic for a phrase [such as an ostinato] to last for eight beats.”).
76 Id. (“A repeating scale degree of 3 that later resolves is a technique used for building up tension
that wants to be released and . . . when such tension is released in a song with a strong beat . . . it is
released to 2.”).
77 Id. (“[S]cale degrees have tendencies in popular music such that, to make a pleasant consonant
sound, 3 wants to go down to 2 and 2 desperately wants to go to 1 because 1 is our home note.”).
78 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *6 (“This is a relatively simple rhythmic choice and . . . no
composer [is] entitled to monopolize the rhythm of eight even quarter notes.”).
79 Id. (“[The timbre] is essentially common since it would be very difficult to monopolize.”).
80 Id. at *5.
81 Id. at *6 (“The nine individual elements that the plaintiffs identify . . . are precisely the kinds
of commonplace elements that courts have routinely denied copyright protection.”).
82 Id. (“The key or scale in which a melody is composed is not protectable as a matter of law.”).
83 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *6.
84 Id.
85 Id. at *7 (“[T]he way that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato resolved is determined by rules of
consonance common in popular music, it is not the type of musical element that is protectable as a
matter of law.”).
86 Id.
87 Id. (“[A]n evenly-syncopated rhythm . . . is also not a protectable element.”).
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by itself, is not entitled to individual copyright protection.88 Eighth, the timbre is yet
another commonplace musical element ineligible for copyright protection.89 Lastly, the
texture of a musical composition is not an element individually afforded copyright
protection.90
After concluding that the individual elements of the “Joyful Noise” ostinato were
not entitled to copyright protection, the court also held that the elements were not
protected as a combination.91 Using the same factors mentioned above, the court
concluded that, even in combination, the individually unprotected elements contained
in the “Joyful Noise” ostinato were ineligible for copyright protection.92 Therefore,
because neither the individual elements nor the combination of the individual
elements were found to be protected copyrightable expression, the court held that
Defendants were not liable for copyright infringement and vacated the $2.8 million
award of damages to Plaintiffs.93
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will argue that the court correctly decided Gray v. Perry when it
concluded that the eight-note ostinato in Defendants’ song, “Dark Horse,” did not
constitute copyright infringement of the eight-note ostinato in Plaintiffs’ song, “Joyful
Noise.”94 In support of this argument, this section will show how the idea-expression
dichotomy applies to commonplace elements of popular music.95 In addition, this
section will demonstrate how the Perry court properly adhered to Ninth Circuit
precedent established by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, when it held that the eight-note

88 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *7 (“[A]n ostinato is a basic musical device that is common in
popular music, [so] the use of an ostinato in a given composition is not, standing alone, protectable.”).
89 Id. (“A synthesized timbre is a commonplace element of contemporary popular music that is
not protectable as a matter of law.”).
90 Id. (“[A] composition’s texture is an inherent feature in any kind of music.”).
91 Id. at *10 (“[T]he signature elements of the 8-note ostinato in “Joyful Noise” . . . [are] not a
particularly unique or rare combination, even in [their] deployment as an ostinato.”).
92 Id. (“[T]he sole musical phrase that plaintiffs claim infringement upon is not protectable
expression . . . and plaintiffs infringement claim fails as a matter of law.”).
93 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *10.
94 Id, at *18 (finding that defendants were not liable for copyright infringement because the
musical elements in the “Joyful Noise” ostinato were neither individually nor collectively protected by
the copyright for the underlying musical composition).
95 See Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940); Granite Music Corp. v. United
Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1976); Selle, 741 F.2d at 905; Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d
1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 1996); Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1259; Cottrill v.
Spears, CIV.A.-02-3646, 2003 WL 21223846, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2003); Griffin v. J-Records, 398
F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143 (E.D. Wash. 2005); Allen v. Destiny’s Child, 06-C-6606, 2009 WL 2178676, at
*12 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2009); Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 616 (E.D. La. 2014); Stefani, 338 F.
Supp. 3d at 1059; Led Zeppelin, 952 F. 3d at 1069. These are all cases decided prior to Gray v. Perry
that assess similar claims of music copyright infringement in which courts have come to the same
conclusion as that of Perry: by way of the idea-expression dichotomy, common elements of popular
music are not subject to copyright protection, and when these elements are asserted as the basis for a
music copyright infringement claim, the claim must necessarily fail.
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ostinato in “Joyful Noise” fails the objective extrinsic test.96 Further, this section will
argue that prior decisions in the Ninth Circuit, which contradict Gray v. Perry or
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, such as Williams v. Gaye, should be overruled as
inconsistent with Ninth Circuit jurisprudence.97 Finally, this section will conclude by
contending that future decisions should follow the precedent set by both Gray v. Perry
and Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, that commonplace musical elements are not subject to
copyright protection, and therefore, cannot serve as the foundation for a claim of
copyright infringement.98
A. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and Popular Music
The idea-expression dichotomy presupposes that generic elements of copyrighted
works are not subject to copyright protection because they are tantamount to ideas.99
The idea-expression dichotomy stands for the fundamental principle that only the
expression of ideas may be protected under copyright law, not the individual ideas
themselves.100 Accordingly, elements of musical compositions that are incapable of
copyright protection on their own fall within the scope of the idea-expression
dichotomy, and therefore, cannot serve as the basis for a copyright infringement claim
because commonplace musical elements are unprotected ideas.101
For years, courts across the United States have recognized and followed the
guidance of the idea-expression dichotomy in decisions regarding music copyright

96 See generally Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1079 (illustrating the precedent that commonplace
musical elements cannot serve as the basis for a copyright infringement claim because they are not
individually protected elements and because they are essential building blocks used for the creation
of music); see Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18.
97 See generally Williams, 895 F.3d at 1143 (holding less than two years prior to the Perry and
Led Zeppelin decisions that common musical elements contained in a twelve-note sequence including
phrases that begin with repeated notes, similar pitch sequences in the first two measures, identical
rhythm, and the use of a melisma, constituted individually protectable elements under copyright law).
98 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18; Led Zeppelin, 852 F.3d at 1079.
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2021) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, [and] [i]n no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea . . . described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”); see also 5 NIMMER, supra note 29, § 19E.04 (noting the
importance of the idea-expression dichotomy as a fundamental principle of copyright law which holds
that ideas are not protected and are characterized as “raw materials that serve as building blocks for
creativity” that enable authors to build on “previous ideas and works.”).
100 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 341; Nike, 883 F.3d at 1119; see also PASSMAN, supra note 23, at 322–25
(reinforcing the general concept that only the expression of ideas is protected, while ideas are
unprotected).
101 See PASSMAN, supra note 23, at 325. Passman succinctly illustrates the concept of
unprotectable common musical elements through two examples: first, if one wrote new lyrics to a song
in the public domain such as “Old MacDonald” or “Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star”, only the new lyrics
could serve as a basis for a copyright infringement claim, not the common melody of these public
domain songs; and second, if one decided to compose a song using the standard blues chord
progression, the chord structure of the song could not serve as the basis for a copyright infringement
claim because it is a common musical element that anyone can borrow from.
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infringement.102 Numerous decisions confirm that the same basic musical elements are
consistently used in musical compositions, especially those that fall within the same
musical genre.103 These basic musical elements are regarded as “building blocks” for
the creation of music, not individually protectable elements of musical compositions.104
In Gray v. Perry, Plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the basic musical elements
contained in the song, “Joyful Noise,” were individually protectable under copyright
law and that Defendants’ song, “Dark Horse,” constituted actionable copyright
infringement of “Joyful Noise.”105 The musical elements that Plaintiffs introduced as
original expression in the “Joyful Noise” ostinato106 were refuted by the court and have
been routinely recognized as unprotectable common musical elements by most
courts.107 As such, the Perry court appropriately recognized the foregoing precedent

102 See Darrell, 113 F.2d at 80; Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d at 720; Selle, 741 F.2d at 905;
Jackson, 84 F.3d at 1221; Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1259; Spears, 2003
WL 21223846, at *9; Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; Destiny’s Child, 2009 WL 2178676, at *12;
Batiste, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 616; Stefani, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1059; Led Zeppelin, 952 F. 3d at 1069. These
cases span a range of eighty years and demonstrate the prevalence of the idea-expression dichotomy
as it relates to music copyright infringement cases. They also underscore the precedent that most
courts across the United States follow: common musical elements are not entitled to copyright
protection individually and only warrant copyright protection collectively when the combination is
found to be substantially original.
103 See Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1068; Batiste, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 615 (“the basic . . . building blocks of
music, especially popular music, have long been treated by courts as well-worn, unoriginal elements
that are not entitled to copyright protection.”); Destiny’s Child, 2009 WL 2178676, at *11; Spears, 2003
WL 21223846, at *9; Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Selle, 741 F.2d at 905; Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d
at 720; see also Darrell, 113 F. 2d at 80 (“There are an enormous number of possible permutations of
the musical notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the . . . demands of
the popular ear.”). Each of these cases recognizes that the same common musical elements frequently
appear in popular music.
104 See Led Zeppelin, 952 F. 3d at 1069; Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d at 721; Newton, 388 F.3d
at 1196; see also Williams, 895 F.3d at 1141 (9th Cir. 2018) (“If a [composer] uses commonplace
[musical] elements, that are firmly rooted in the genre’s tradition, the expression is unoriginal and
thus uncopyrightable.”).
105 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *1
106 Id. at *6–7. The plaintiffs erroneously pointed to the scale, major and minor keys, phrase
length, pitch sequence, chord progression, resolution, rhythm, syncopation, ostinato, timbre, and
texture in “Joyful Noise” as examples of expressive musical elements despite the fact that each of
these elements have been refuted as being individually capable of copyright protection.
107 See Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 at 1071 (“Just as we do not give an author a monopoly over
the note of B-flat, . . . scales and arpeggios cannot be copyrighted . . . .”); see also Gaste, 863 F.2d at
1068 (finding that modulation between major and minor keys is a common musical element, not
individually protected under copyright); Darrell, 113 F.2d at 80 (characterizing a phrase length of
eight notes with similar pitch as common or “trite” and not entitled to individual copyright protection);
Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d at 720 (recognizing that a four-note pitch sequence that often appears
in pop music is not individually protected by copyright); Carey, 376 F.3d at 848 (conceding that chord
progressions are a common musical element not individually protected by copyright); Stefani, 338 F.
Supp. 3d at 1060 (showing that common musical elements such as rhythm, beat, and syncopation are
not individually protected under copyright); Jackson, 84 F.3d at 1216 (defining a motive as a short
musical phrase, usually comprised of only a few notes, and concluding that common motives, such as
ostinatos, are basic musical elements that are not given individual copyright protection); Batiste, 28
F. Supp. 3d at 623 (explaining that synthesized timbre and texture are basic musical elements within
the pop genre and are not individually protected by copyright).
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pertaining to the common features of popular music108 and correctly applied it when it
decided that the “Dark Horse” ostinato did not infringe on the “Joyful Noise”
ostinato.109 The court properly concluded that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato necessarily
fails the extrinsic test110 because none of the individual elements of the ostinato were
independently protected by the overarching musical composition copyright.111
In addition to its failure to show individual copyrightability of the musical
elements at issue, Plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that the individual musical
elements of the “Joyful Noise” ostinato were protected as a combination.112 The court
correctly concluded that, “the musical elements that comprise the 8-note ostinato in
‘Joyful Noise’ are [not] numerous enough [or] arranged in a sufficiently original
manner to warrant copyright protection.”113 Plaintiffs’ music copyright infringement
claim was limited to the recurring eight-note “Joyful Noise” ostinato, and there is no
precedent showing that the combination of eight notes into a musical phrase warrants
copyright protection.114 In fact, there are several decisions showing that short musical
phrases are not protectable expression under copyright law.115 Accordingly, the court
was correct in finding that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the extrinsic test on the
alternative ground of demonstrating that the musical elements at issue in the “Joyful
108 See Destiny’s Child, 2009 WL 2178676, at *12; Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; Spears, 2003
WL 21223846, at *9; Newton, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1258; Williams, 895 F.3d at 1140; Tisi, 97 F. Supp.
2d at 548; Selle, 741 F.2d at 905; Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 485. The preceding cases provide
instances where courts have characterized additional musical elements as basic ingredients for the
creation of music and thus, deemed them individually unprotected by copyright. Some of these
additional elements include intervallic structure, pitch sequences ranging from three to eight pitches,
time signature, musical genre, tempo, theme, hook phrase, and a fading ending.
109 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *7.
110 See id. at *3; see also Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 485. Recall that the extrinsic test
requires a determination of the protected elements of a copyrighted song and a determination of
whether protected elements are substantially similar to an allegedly infringing song.
111 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18. As is the case in Perry, when a plaintiff fails to satisfy the
extrinsic test altogether, it means that they failed to show that the musical elements at issue were
either individually or collectively protectable under copyright.
112 Id. at *10.
113 See id.; see also Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1071 (“We have never extended copyright protection
to just a few notes. Instead, we have held that a four-note sequence common in the music field is not
the copyrightable expression in a song.”).
114 See Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *11 (“[T]he sole musical phrase that plaintiffs claim
infringement upon is not protectable expression, the extrinsic test is not satisfied, and plaintiffs
infringement claim . . . fails as a matter of law.”); but see Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“Each note in a scale is not protectable, but a pattern of notes in a tune may earn copyright
protection.”). Even though the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a pattern of notes can potentially
receive copyright protection, its cases have not established that an eight-note combination of notes
warrants this potential protection.
115 See Stefani, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1060 (finding no protection for the combination of five common
musical elements even when they were used throughout the entire song); Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at
1143 (finding no protection for a combination of common musical elements used in a seven-note
melodic sequence); Destiny’s Child, 2009 WL 2178676, at *12 (finding no protection for a three-note
sequence that used combined common musical elements in a musical composition); Jackson, 84 F.3d
at 1216 (holding that a relatively common eight-note combination of unprotected elements was not
original enough even in combination, to be protected under copyright). These cases exhibit that
individually unprotected elements, even when combined into short musical phrases, are not eligible
for copyright protection because they fail to satisfy the originality requirement necessary to receive
copyright protection.
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Noise” ostinato were protectable expression when combined, because the ostinato itself
is an unprotectable combination of common musical elements that cannot serve as the
basis for a music copyright infringement claim.
B. The Led Zeppelin Decision
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin116 was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
shortly before the court’s decision in Gray v. Perry117 and played a large role in the
Perry court’s decision.118 Together, these two cases establish a firm precedent in the
Ninth Circuit: music copyright infringement claims that center around issues of
commonplace musical elements in a copyrighted song and an alleged infringing song,
will generally fail as a matter of law because these elements are individually
unprotectable under copyright law as basic elements necessary to the composition of
music.
Similar to the inquiry in Gray v. Perry,119 the Led Zeppelin court was tasked with
determining whether Led Zeppelin’s song, “Stairway to Heaven,” infringed on the
musical composition copyright in the band Spirit’s song, “Taurus.”120 Spirit’s copyright
infringement claim was limited to the eight-measure introduction of “Stairway to
Heaven” and alleged that Led Zeppelin improperly copied protected elements of
“Taurus” into the opening sequence.121 Consequently, the Led Zeppelin decision
provided much of the framework for the court’s decision in Gray v. Perry122 because it
embarked on an analysis revolving around the objective extrinsic test and came to the
same conclusion: basic musical elements common to all musical compositions are not
subject to copyright protection individually or when combined.123
In Led Zeppelin, as in Perry, the plaintiffs attempted to assert that common
musical elements including scale, key signature, arpeggios, note duration, successive
eight-note rhythm, and pitch sequence are individually protected copyrightable
expression.124 However, even the plaintiffs’ own expert witness conceded that scales
and arpeggios are common musical elements, and Led Zeppelin’s expert witness aptly
pointed out that the similarities claimed by the plaintiffs were “unprotectable musical
elements.”125

Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1055.
Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *1.
118 Id. at *3, *5, *8, *10, *11, *13. The court relied on the Led Zeppelin decision extensively in its
opinion.
119 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *1.
120 Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1054.
121 Id. at 1058. Again, this is similar to the Gray v. Perry decision because the copyright
infringement claim was limited to a short musical sequence.
122 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18.
123 Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1071 (“[A] limited set of a useful three-note sequence and other
common musical elements [are] not protectable.”).
124 Id. at 1069 (“[C]opyright does not protect ideas, themes, or common musical elements, such as
descending chromatic scales, arpeggios, or short sequences of three notes.”).
125 Id. at 1060.
116
117
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The court correctly found in favor of Led Zeppelin and recognized that the
elements at issue were not individually protected by copyright law126 and, therefore,
could not underscore a claim for music copyright infringement.127 In its decision, the
court also emphasized the fact that it is impermissible for an author to lay claim to the
common ingredients that comprise the foundation of all musical compositions.128
In addition, the court refuted the plaintiffs’ argument that the unprotected
musical elements contained in “Taurus” were collectively protected as a combination,
just as the Perry court concluded the same about the eight-note “Joyful Noise”
ostinato.129 In Gray v. Perry,130 the court firmly adhered to the precedent established
by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin.131 It was correct to do so because the majority of music
copyright infringement cases across the United States have recognized that common
musical elements are individually unprotectable and cannot support a claim for music
copyright infringement.132
C. Williams v. Gaye: A Contradictory Decision
The holding in Williams v. Gaye133 contradicts both the precedent set by the Ninth
Circuit in Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin134 and the decision of the Central District of

126 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2021); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46 (recognizing that copyright
does require at least a modicum of creativity and does not protect every aspect of a work); Jackson, 84
F.3d at 1216 (finding that copyright does not extend to “common or trite” musical elements); Williams,
895 F.3d at 1140–41 (conceding that copyright does not protect “commonplace elements that are firmly
rooted in a genre’s tradition.”).
127 Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1069 (“These building blocks belong in the public domain and cannot
be exclusively appropriated by any particular author;” “[Songwriters] borrow from predecessors’
[songs] to create new ones, so giving exclusive rights to the first [songwriter] who incorporated [a
common musical element] would frustrate the purpose of copyright law . . . .”).
128 Id. at 1070 (repeating that no individual may own non-protectable musical building blocks).
129 Id. at 1075 (concluding that the selection and arrangement of the intros to the songs “Taurus”
and “Stairway to Heaven” were not substantially similar because the songs do not share substantial
amounts of the same combination of unprotectable elements).
130 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18.
131 Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1079.
132 See Darrell, 113 F.2d at 80; Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d at 720; Selle, 741 F.2d at 905;
Jackson, 84 F.3d at 1221; Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1259; Spears, 2003
WL 21223846, at *9; Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; Destiny’s Child, 2009 WL 2178676, at *12;
Batiste, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 616 ; Stefani, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1059; Led Zeppelin, 952 F. 3d at 1069;
Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1068; Carey, 376 F.3d at 848; Williams, 895 F.3d at 1140; Three Boys Music Corp.,
212 F.3d at 485 (providing cases in the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits as well as their respective
district courts, and additional district courts, which recognize that the musical elements common to
all musical compositions are not individually protected under copyright law and are only protected as
a combination when the arrangement and combination is significantly original).
133 See generally Williams, 895 F.3d at 1114 (holding that the song “Blurred Lines” by Pharrell
Williams and Robin Thicke infringed on the song “Got to Give it Up” by Marvin Gaye where a
combination of six similar musical elements appeared in both songs).
134 See generally Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1074 (holding that the song “Stairway to Heaven” by
the band Led Zeppelin did not infringe on the song “Taurus” by the band Spirit where the combination
of five similar musical elements was used in each song).
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California in Gray v. Perry.135 Accordingly, the decision should be overruled as
inconsistent with Ninth Circuit music copyright infringement jurisprudence.136 In fact,
in both the Led Zeppelin137 and Perry138 decisions, the court expressly embraced the
dissent in Williams over the majority opinion.139
The dissent in Williams v. Gaye sharply disputes the majority opinion and argues
that the musical elements the Gaye estate based its infringement claim on are
unprotected under copyright law, both individually and when combined.140 The dissent
astutely opined that “musical compositions are expressed primarily through the
building blocks of melody, harmony, and rhythm” and consequently “not all expression
is protectable [and] the mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every
element of the work may be protected.”141 These assertions by the dissent, recognizing
the idea-expression dichotomy and its application to music copyright infringement,
exemplify that its reasoning is correct and that the majority opinion in Williams v.
Gaye142 should be overruled as inconsistent with the holdings of Skidmore v. Led
Zeppelin143 and Perry v. Gray.144
D. The Future of Copyright Infringement Suits
It is essential that future court decisions surrounding the issue of music copyright
infringement adhere and apply the precedent set by Gray v. Perry and its sister
decision, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin. These cases solidify the application of the ideaexpression dichotomy in the context of popular music and overwhelmingly recognize
that common musical elements are akin to ideas, which are not subject to copyright
protection. When common musical elements are the foundation of a music copyright
infringement claim, the claim cannot survive.

135 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *11 (holding that the song “Dark Horse” by Katy Perry and Juicy
J did not infringe on the song “Joyful Noise” by Marcus Gray where the combination of nine common
musical elements was present in each song).
136 See Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d at 720; Jackson, 84 F.3d at 1221; Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d
at 1259; Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; Stefani, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1059; Led Zeppelin, 952 F. 3d at
1069 (listing several cases decided in the Ninth Circuit and its district courts which concluded that a
song is not infringed where the similarities in the alleged infringing song are common musical
elements essential to the creation of all musical compositions).
137 See Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1069, 1071 (citing the dissent in Williams v. Gaye that “copyright
[does not] extend to commonplace elements that are firmly rooted in the genre’s tradition.”). The court
also joined in the dissent’s skepticism regarding the idea that three notes used in a song can be
copyrightable and observing that there is a minimal amount of note combinations that are useful in a
musical composition.
138 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *5 (citing the dissenting opinion in Williams v. Gaye).
139 Williams, 895 F.3d at 1138–51.
140 Id. at 1143–50 (discounting the majority opinion and showing that common musical elements
such as repeated notes, pitch, rhythm, hook phrases, keyboard parts, bass line, and lyrics are not
individually protected under copyright law and that the signature phrases in each song are not
protected as a combination either).
141 Id. at 1140–42.
142 Id. at 1114–38.
143 Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1079.
144 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18.
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V. CONCLUSION
The court was correct when it held that the “Dark Horse” ostinato did not infringe
upon the “Joyful Noise” ostinato. As a result, Katy Perry and Juicy J emerged from
Gray v. Perry145 as clear winners over Plaintiffs. On the other hand, Marcus Gray and
the other plaintiffs, were left feeling like Defendants were “The One That Got Away.”146
However, litigation in a music copyright infringement suit is “Never Really Over,”147
as evidenced by Plaintiffs’ efforts to appeal Judge Christina Snyder’s final judgment
as a matter of law in favor of Perry and Juicy J.148
The court was correct when it ruled in favor of Perry and Juicy J because
Plaintiffs’ music copyright infringement claim was based on commonplace musical
elements that cannot be used as the foundation for a copyright infringement claim.149
Ostinatos, short reoccurring musical themes, are a common mechanism used in
popular music and musical compositions, and are one of the essential building blocks
used to create a song.150 To extend copyright protection to eight notes in succession
throughout a musical composition, would be tantamount to granting copyright
protection to an idea rather than the original expression of the idea.151 The principle
of the idea-expression dichotomy exists to preserve such things as commonplace
musical elements for the general use of all songwriters when composing new songs.152
Future court decisions that address issues of music copyright infringement must
keep the decisions of Gray v. Perry153 and Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin154 at the forefront
of their opinions and adhere to the precedent they set: commonplace musical elements
or musical building blocks used for the creation of all songs cannot serve as the
foundation for allegations of music copyright infringement. Ultimately, previous cases

145 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18 (granting Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law,
vacating the jury verdicts as to liability and damages, declaring that Plaintiffs’ failed to satisfy the
extrinsic test, and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for prejudgment interest).
146 See id.; see also KATY PERRY, THE ONE THAT GOT AWAY (Capitol Records 2011).
147 See KATY PERRY, NEVER REALLY OVER (Capitol Records 2019).
148 See Record of Petitioner’s Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Gray v. Hudson, 2020
WL 20-55401 (showing the appeal that plaintiffs filed following the ruling in Gray v. Perry). The
original appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was filed on April 15, 2020, less than a month
after the district court entered its judgment.
149 See generally Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *1–*18 (holding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy
the extrinsic test, which asks what the protected elements of a song are, when its only basis for music
copyright infringement against the defendants was a similar eight note ostinato present in both
songs).
150 Id. at *18 (defining the term “ostinato” as a short musical phrase or rhythmic pattern repeated
in a musical composition).
151 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2021).
152 See 5 NIMMER, supra note 29, § 19E.04 (commenting on the purpose of the idea-expression
dichotomy in preserving the use of generic or common elements for use in future works and providing
that general elements of creative works, like musical compositions, cannot be monopolized by one
songwriter).
153 Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18.
154 Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1079.
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contrary to the decisions of Perry155 and Led Zeppelin,156 such as Williams v. Gaye,157
should be overruled as inconsistent with the precedent of the Ninth Circuit.158

Perry, 2020 WL 1275221, at *18.
Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1079.
157 Williams, 895 F.3d at 1114.
158 See Darrell, 113 F.2d at 80; Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d at 720; Selle, 741 F.2d at 905;
Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 1996); Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at
1259; Spears, 2003 WL 21223846, at *9; Griffin, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; Destiny’s Child, 2009 WL
2178676, at *12; Batiste, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 616; Stefani, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1059; Led Zeppelin, 952 F.
3d at 1069 (providing a string of cases in the Ninth Circuit, its lower district courts, and other federal
courts throughout the United States, dating back to 1940, which uphold the finding that due to the
idea-expression dichotomy codified in the Copyright Act, common elements of popular music are not
subject to copyright protection and, therefore, when these elements are asserted as the basis for a
music copyright infringement claim, the claim must necessarily fail).
155
156

